INTRODUCTION
A woman sent Phoenix Calida photographs of her tattoos so that if someone killed her at work, Calida could identify her body. 1 After being raped and assaulted, TS Sonja now carries a concealed handgun to work because she has lost access to screening tools that kept dangerous people away from her. 2 Vanity, a young transgender woman, took her own life because she could no longer make ends meet in her increasingly dangerous and uncertain industry. 3 According to the 485 members of Congress who supported the law 4 and the numerous celebrities who appeared in public service announcements evangelizing it, 5 the Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017 6 ("FOSTA") was going to save people. 7 FOSTA enjoyed a glowing narrative as a panacea for sexual corruption in the United States: it would reduce deaths, prevent rapes, and gut the marketplace for abusive sexual activity. 8 Pimps 9 would no longer be able to so readily sell a 9. In popular culture, the term "pimp" often connotes a coercive relationship. In reality, third parties that facilitate or benefit from commercial sex may or may not be doing so with the legitimate consent of the individual performing the sexual service. woman's 10 body, and children would be safe from predation. 11 These results were as good as guaranteed because a significant amount of sex trafficking occurs online. 12 FOSTA would make it a crime for websites to continue allowing malefactors to advertise for this abhorrent behavior on their platforms. 13 With trafficking off the internet, the sex industry would shrivel. 14 The right parties would be held responsible. 15 No one would get hurt.
Within one month of FOSTA's enactment, thirteen sex workers 16 were reported missing, and two were dead from suicide. 17 Sex workers operating independently faced a tremendous and immediate uptick in unwanted solicitation from individuals offering or demanding to traffic them. 18 Numerous others were raped, assaulted, and rendered homeless or unable to feed their children. 19 These egregious acts of violence and economic from sex work, which is not, it will avoid the word "pimp" and use the word "trafficker" instead to indicate an exploitative third-party relationship.
10. This Note acknowledges that not all sex workers and sex-trafficking victims are cisgender women. An in-depth analysis of how FOSTA disproportionately affects marginalized communities involved in either activity, including the transgender community, is largely beyond the scope of this Note; however, this should not be interpreted as an erasure of the lived experiences of such individuals or of any disproportionate harm they might face.
11 16. This Note uses the term "sex worker" and its derivatives in place of more antiquated or derogatory phrasing as it is a less stigmatized and more broadly accurate term for consensual sexual services performed in exchange for compensation. 47, 49-50 (2016) . The word "prostitution" and its derivatives will be used in reference to legal materials that employ the term or in situations where the deliberate use of this phrasing is necessary to make a distinction. While this Note takes the position that voluntary sex work is legitimate and deserving of protection, nothing in this Note is intended to indicate a lack of support for the victims of sex trafficking. 19. Janet Burns, Sex Workers and Immigrants Are Under Attack. Don't Like It? Send DC a Fax, FORBES (Dec. 5, 2018, 2:48 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/janetwburns/ 2018/12/05/sex-workers-and-immigrants-are-under-attack-dont-like-it-send-warner-a-fax/ [https://perma.cc/877Y-9S6G] (recognizing that FOSTA "already ha[s] a body count" and lamenting that "women . . . have been raped" and "have lost their homes" and that " [t] ens or hundreds of thousands of people across the US have no way to support themselves now, and no hope"); see also Violet Blue, Suicide, Violence, and Going Underground: FOSTA's Body devastation are directly attributable to FOSTA's enactment. Meanwhile, law enforcement professionals have complained that their investigations into sextrafficking cases have been "blinded"-they no longer have advertisements to subpoena, digital records to produce for prosecutors, and leads that can bring them to live crime scenes full of evidence, like hotel rooms. 20 This blindness is not for lack of anything to see: one report suggests that online sex trafficking is as prevalent as ever. 21 How did this legislation miss the mark so egregiously? And why is it still the law?
To respond to these questions, this Note explores FOSTA's imprecise means and unfortunate ends. Part I introduces the legal landscape that permitted these collateral consequences. First, this Part articulates the important distinction between sex trafficking and sex work and highlights how FOSTA harmfully conflates these activities. Second, it describes the history of 47 U.S.C. § 230-the internet-immunity provision that supposedly necessitated FOSTA's intervention for the government to hold websites accountable for online sex trafficking-and how FOSTA implicates sex workers in its attempt to protect victims of sex trafficking. Finally, it outlines First Amendment overbreadth doctrine to contextualize one of the main legal concerns regarding FOSTA and the source of the law's broad negative effects.
Part II discusses FOSTA's arguable unconstitutionality under the First Amendment due to its overbreadth. FOSTA's criminalization of any internet discussion that "promotes or facilitates prostitution" ultimately prevents consensual sex workers and their advocates from sharing health and safety information-dialogue that constitutes protected speech. Further, FOSTA could proscribe political speech that advocates for more permissive legal treatment of prostitution.
Part III explores policy arguments for and against FOSTA. It notes that the law results in disastrous health and safety outcomes for sex workers by forcing the industry back into the street and generally fails to achieve its stated goal of protecting victims of sex trafficking.
Finally, Part IV argues that FOSTA cannot stand as written. While redrafting could resolve some of the law's constitutional issues, this Note argues that repeal, coupled with structured replacement legislation, is the only viable option to truly accomplish FOSTA's stated goals without Congress enacted FOSTA in April 2018 to hold websites liable for usergenerated content that facilitates sex trafficking-rescinding the nearcategorical immunity that such sites had previously enjoyed from liability for culpable hosted content-and to make intentionally hosting such material a federal crime. 22 But some have argued that the language of the law has far wider implications than that goal would suggest and unconstitutionally chills a substantial amount of protected speech under the First Amendment. 23 Contextualizing FOSTA within the preexisting law that governs sex work and sex trafficking, internet immunity, and First Amendment jurisprudence brings the statute's purpose, effect, and flaws into focus.
Part I.A provides an overview of laws governing the sale of sexual services in the United States and distinguishes trafficking activity from consensual sex work. Part I.B details the history of internet liability law in the United States, describing how it has prohibited or permitted third-party liability for user-generated content and how FOSTA altered existing law. Part I.C outlines the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine and the relevant jurisprudence necessary to evaluate claims for and against FOSTA's constitutionality.
A. Consent and Coercion: Categorizing Commercial Sex
Sex trafficking and sex work are not interchangeable terms. 24 While precise standards vary, the definition of sex trafficking generally involves using "force, fraud, or coercion" to compel another person to engage in commercial sexual conduct. 25 Sex work, conversely, refers to the exchange, by adults, of money or goods for consensual sexual services. 26 Determining the existence of coercion can be difficult, as consent entails more than outward willingness to participate in something-an assent obtained under circumstances of disproportionate power may have been coerced even in the absence of an explicit threat. 27 However, consent is a crucial determinant in defining and distinguishing trafficking victims and sex workers as distinct groups. 28 Many anti-trafficking advocates assert that there is no such thing as voluntary sex work or that individuals engaging in sex work uncoerced compose such a minority that laws infringing on their business for the sake of helping victims are fully justified. 29 However, unilateral lawmaking that focuses on the sexual transaction as a de facto evil, rather than identifying coercive circumstances as the event that creates a victim, fundamentally misunderstands both the unique horror of trafficking and the legitimate agency inherent in sex work. 30 Efforts to curtail sex trafficking that treat all commercial sex as criminal may actually drive true trafficking further from regulatory purview-"saving" those who do not see themselves as victims and threatening constitutionally protected speech of an even remotely sexual nature. 31 Though the law does not always articulate this distinction clearly, separate bodies of jurisprudence have developed to govern coerced and voluntary sexual labor. 32 While both activities are largely criminalized in the United States, two critical points deserve emphasis: first, not all forms of sex work are illegal, and second, not all illegal sex work constitutes sex trafficking. 33 Part I.A.1 provides background on sex-trafficking legislation and relevant treaties in effect in the United States. Part I.A.2 details domestic laws governing sex work, usually referred to in legislation as "prostitution." 34
Legal Efforts to Stop Domestic Sex Trafficking
Though experts disagree about the size of the sex-trafficking industry in the United States, 35 sexual services is abhorrent and deserves the attention of the legal community. Historically, much anti-trafficking law has either presumed that all sex work is inherently exploitative or has declined to address consent in definitions of trafficking. 36 The earliest international conventions on the subject focused on the fraudulent "recruitment and transportation" of women 37 without addressing "the end purposes of the trafficking" at all. 38 Conventions in 1933 and 1949 explicitly stated that "victim" consent was not a barrier to the prosecution of a trafficking offense. 39 The 1979 United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women ("CEDAW"), in contrast, distinguishes sex work from exploitative prostitution and is focused only on combatting the latter, 40 but the United States has not ratified this treaty. 41 Domestically, the United States did not enact federal legislation specifically addressing sex trafficking until the cusp of the twenty-first century, prosecuting traffickers under either the Mann Act of 1910, 42 which prohibits transporting individuals interstate for the purposes of prostitution, or Civil War-era statutes outlawing involuntary servitude. 43 The keystone effort to update this legal territory was the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 44 (TVPA), passed as part of omnibus legislation that created and amended law across a broad swath of federal titles and represented "the first federal law to criminalize trafficking in persons." 45 term 'sex trafficking' means the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for the purpose of a commercial sex act." 46 Interestingly, the TVPA includes coercion as a factor in nonsexual trafficking offenses but declines to include it in the definition of sex trafficking, though it is a required element in the crime of sex trafficking under the TVPA when the trafficked person is over the age of majority. 47 Sex trafficking that involves "force, fraud or coercion" or compels a sexual act from a person under age eighteen is defined as a "severe form[] of trafficking in persons" 48 and is a crime under 18 U.S.C. § 1591. 49 The trafficking of children is punished more severely than the trafficking of adults, irrespective of coercion. 50 The internet introduced a new arena where sexual services could be bought and sold. 51 The Stop Advertising Victims of Exploitation (SAVE) Act of 2015 52 added "advertising" as a mode of conduct criminalized under 18 U.S.C. § 1591, making it explicitly illegal to knowingly advertise sex trafficking or benefit financially from such advertising. 53 
Treatment of Sex Work in the United States
The United States tolerated prostitution-the exchange of sex for moneyfor much of the nation's early history. 54 Efforts to corral and criminalize the practice, generally "under a theory of morality or social nuisance," 55 only gained prevalence in the early twentieth century. 56 61 Attempts to establish a constitutional right to engage in sex work under the Fourteenth Amendment's privacy penumbra, through which other sex-related activity that had once been considered morally repugnant became legalized, have been unsuccessful. 62 The majority of legislation governing sex work has been enacted at the state level. 63 In the early twentieth century, due to moral outrage, burgeoning xenophobia, and public health concerns, states began to curtail prostitution, often by enacting legislation to limit or regulate the course of business, before eventually outlawing it altogether. 64 Today, prostitution is legal only in select parts of Nevada. 65 Nevertheless, sex work remains a thriving, if mostly illicit, national industry. 66 While the exact definitions of prostitution differ across states, criminal statutes tend to define the act as involving "some degree of sexual activity or conduct, . . . compensation, and . . . intent to commit prostitution," 67 with the precise scope of conduct and surrounding circumstances also subject to stateto-state variation. 68 Several states also prohibit "pandering," definitions of which generally involve giving payment to another individual to engage in sexual activity or conduct. 69 69. See Davis, supra note 57, at 839. 70. A blatant example of legal sexual work is pornography of adults, which is legal in all fifty states and is beyond the scope of this Note. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (holding that "the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit making mere private possession of obscene material a crime"). Legal activity closer to the traditional prototype of prostitution may include companionship escorting, fetish work that is not explicitly sexual, exotic dancing (i.e., stripping), camera work (i.e., where an individual performs an activity for the viewer's sexual gratification via webcam), and involvement in the "sugar dating" industry. early internet jurisprudence that inadvertently incentivized websites not to moderate user-posted content. 71 In recent years, many have argued that this immunity had been misapplied to permit crime (especially sex crimes) to proliferate; it was from this concern that FOSTA emerged. 72 This section describes the legal history of website liability for third-party content and the genesis of "host immunity," discusses conflicts that this immunity created as the internet has evolved in recent years, outlines FOSTA's legislative support and provisions, and contextualizes and clarifies the role that one major website played in mobilizing support FOSTA.
A Brief History of Digital Liberty and Liability
In an attempt to corral the "Wild West" landscape of an increasingly ubiquitous and exponentially growing commercial internet, Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996. 73 This Act represented a tremendous modernization of its predecessor, the Communications Act of 1934, 74 and implemented many significant changes intended to encourage market growth and preserve civil liberties. 75 However, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 also included a bill to increase regulation of speech on the internet: the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), 76 which sought, inter alia, to shield minors from obscenity and harm by criminalizing the knowing posting of indecent material online where minors could encounter it. 77 The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) swiftly challenged the CDA as unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment. 78 The U.S. Supreme Court agreed, striking down the majority of the CDA, including the provisions proscribing indecent content, within the year. 79 What did survive the challenge, however, was the CDA's addition of § 230 to title 47 of the U.S. Code ("Section 230"), which eliminated a legal loophole 80 over the degree of responsibility that interactive computer services had for the third- party content they hosted. 81 This legislation helped establish the internet we recognize today. 82 User-interactive computer services (UISPs), 83 a subset of interactive computer services, are websites that offer a forum for users to post their own content, and include all social media platforms, chatrooms, "comment" features on any website, and most digital marketplaces. 84 Today, UISPs represent the face of the internet for billions of people worldwide. 85 However, for the fledgling internet of the 1990s, UISPs presented a slew of novel legal questions that print-media jurisprudence proved an imperfect guide for resolving. 86 The act of posting something online has no true equivalent in print media. It is reasonable to assume that a publisher of printed material has complete knowledge of the third-party content it disseminates because the publisher must have reviewed that content in some conscious, editorial way prior to releasing it. 87 In contrast, the internet made it possible for publication to be 81. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (2012) (defining an interactive computer service as "any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions"). . In today's common technological parlance, the acronym "ISP" generally stands for "internet service provider," which is understood to refer to broadband service providers like Verizon and AT&T. While such providers also fall within Section 230's purview, the role of these entities in the publication of content differs substantially from those of blogs and social media platforms. Id. Accordingly, for clarity and to avoid unwieldy pluralization, this Note refers specifically to websites with a content-hosting function that allows interactive user behavior as "User-Interactive Service Providers," or UISPs.
84 instantaneous and effectively automatic.
This power permitted an unprecedented scale of communication, which accordingly necessitated a new body of jurisprudence specific to the online world. 88 Relying on analogies to pre-internet paradigms, pre-CDA case law established a legal incongruity that disincentivized UISPs from moderating content on their platforms altogether. 89 Judge Peter K. Leisure of the Southern District of New York likened UISPs that took no moderating action whatsoever to newsstands, reasoning that each plausibly had no knowledge of the third-party content they hosted and could therefore not be held legally responsible for that content's substance. 90 Conversely, UISPs that took steps to moderate content donned a publisher's hat in doing so, and in exercising knowledge of-and control over-the third-party content posted to their platforms, they thereby accepted liability for actionable content they failed to delete. 91 This jurisprudence created a dilemma wherein it was more advantageous for UISPs to entirely abdicate moderator duties-and thus responsibility for content-than to open the door to broad liability by engaging in moderation that could later prove inexact. 92 Section 230 closed this "loophole" by providing websites with federal immunity from civil liability 93 for user-posted content. 94 Section 230 specifically stated that UISPs could not be considered publishers or speakers of third-party content 95 and further precluded civil liability for the moderation of said content-in other words, a UISP's imperfect moderation would no longer expose it to litigation. 96 to neutralize "the threat that tort-based lawsuits pose to freedom of speech," 97 as well as to "encourag[e] private efforts to deal with Internet indecency," "promote the continued development of the Internet," and "preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services." 98 The subsection of Section 230 that actually grants this immunity is notably titled "Protection for 'Good Samaritan' blocking and screening of offensive material": Section 230 was designed to encourage UISPs to moderate content, not to abandon supervisory obligations entirely. 99 Under pre-FOSTA Section 230, a website like Facebook could not be held legally liable if a user's post on its platform violated a civil law-for instance, if it was defamatory-although, of course, the same immunity was not extended to the actual writer of the defamatory content. 100 In addition to promoting free speech, this immunity made it possible for smaller UISPsthose that lacked the capital to aggressively police third-party content or defend against lawsuits-to proliferate. 101 For these reasons, at least until recently, Section 230 was "lauded as 'the most important law protecting Internet speech' and called 'perhaps the most influential law to protect the kind of innovation that has allowed the Internet to thrive.'" 102
Has Free Speech Become a Free Pass?
Even before FOSTA, Section 230 garnered its share of critics, many of whom felt that the law was overly permissive of, and offered no recourse against, bad conduct in what had quickly become a ubiquitous personal, professional, and commercial space. 103 Some argued that the law granted broader liberties than its drafters intended when severed from the rest of the original CDA; 104 that any need to proactively stimulate the free market online had long since become obsolete given the internet's accelerating ubiquity since the 1990s; 105 and that new internet-age challenges pitting free speech and open-market concerns against concerns over digital privacy and safety justified reassessing the costs and benefits of the status quo. 106 111 There, the defendant required users to fill out a questionnaire that affirmatively elicited discriminatory information, which then appeared in user-generated content on the defendant's platformsuch activity crossed the line into actual content production on the part of the UISP. 112 In Backpage.com, conversely, the First Circuit declined to find that the defendant UISP could be held liable for alleged trafficking violations committed by its users, even when it performed some editorial activities on those posts, because Section 230 precluded claims that would treat a website as the publisher of third-party content. 113 Many members of the public found the latter ruling morally outrageous, and along with similar lawsuits, Backpage.com helped engender a movement to remove this legal impediment to liability. 114 [T]he networked environment today is profoundly different from the one in 1996. Twenty years ago, commercial service providers had twelve million subscribers. FOSTA's drafters officially intended to target UISPs functioning as online marketplaces that either failed to remove or actively solicited advertisements for sexual services by eliminating Section 230 immunity for these UISPs. 115 The bill's introductory text describes its purpose:
To amend the Communications Act of 1934 to clarify that section 230 of such Act does not prohibit the enforcement against providers and users of interactive computer services of Federal and State criminal and civil law relating to sexual exploitation of children or sex trafficking, and for other purposes. 116 Section 230, Congress opined, had been co-opted against its drafters' wishes to permit sex trafficking to proceed unhindered on the internet. 117 It allowed websites to encourage sex traffickers to utilize their platforms, profiting from advertisement revenue while enjoying immunity from liability that legislators never intended Section 230 to grant. 118 The bill enjoyed broad bipartisan support 119 As written, FOSTA may apply to a broader portion of the internet than its stated objectives would appear to target. The law does not limit criminal liability to websites functioning as marketplaces or even to content that takes the form of advertisements. 126 It does not rescind immunity solely over content involving sex trafficking but also criminalizes the hosting of content involving prostitution. 127 FOSTA also relies on several undefined terms. Neither § 2421A nor post-FOSTA Section 230 defines "promotion" or "facilitation." 128 FOSTA's drafters appear to recognize a difference between "prostitution" and "sex trafficking" by naming both concepts, but as the Act defines neither, the precise distinction intended by the legislature is unclear. 129 However, a House Judiciary Committee report called the two activities "inextricably linked" and stated that "where prostitution is legalized or tolerated, there is a greater demand for human trafficking victims and nearly always an increase in the number of women and children trafficked into commercial sex slavery." 130 FOSTA's criminal statutory provision includes a noteworthy scienter requirement. The Stop Enabling Sex Trafficking Act (SESTA), 131 an earlier, unenacted Senate version of the bill, would have criminalized the knowing promotion or facilitation of prostitution. 132 Internet-law experts have noted that this would have reintroduced the "[m]oderator's dilemma" faced by UISPs in the pre-CDA era, wherein websites would be discouraged from taking any steps (i.e., moderation) that would demonstrate "knowledge" of third-party speech on their platforms. 133 FOSTA, conversely, requires that such "promotion or facilitation" be intentional, but creates an "aggravated violation" to criminalize UISPs acting in "reckless disregard" of the manner in which this intentional conduct contributes to sex trafficking. 134 Proponents of the law suggest that this requirement is narrowly tailored to inculpate only UISPs that aim to profit from commercial sex while ignoring where such activity is legal. Id. § 2421A(e). These provisions are beyond the scope of this Note. 126 that it facilitated sex trafficking by invoking Section 230 immunity. 142 However, FOSTA was not yet law at the time of Backpage.com's indictment, and thus it was ultimately shuttered despite Section 230 existing "intact" at the time. 143 Many media sources subsequently credited FOSTA with Backpage.com's closure. 144 From a policy standpoint, the effects of the Backpage.com shutdown were not especially distinguishable from FOSTA's effects more generally: FOSTA likely could have precluded most of Backpage.com's business; closing Backpage.com was an explicit impetus for passing FOSTA; and the law's impending existence after it passed through Congress-along with its drafted retroactivity provision-prompted similar UISPs, like Craigslist, to self-censor before the law was actually enacted. 145 Nevertheless, the legal power to close Backpage.com existed prior to, and separately from, FOSTA. 146
C. Overbreadth Doctrine Under the First Amendment
The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech." 147 With several well-developed exceptions, government regulation of "content-based" speech 148 is presumptively unconstitutional 149 and subject to examination under a strict level of scrutiny, 150 The First Amendment may preclude legislation that limits unprotected speech if the law is overbroad in a way that proscribes protected speech as well. 160 A law that furthers a legitimate government purpose but nonetheless curtails protected speech may be found unconstitutional when narrower means to achieve that legitimate end exist. 161 However, when a law is "readily susceptible" to limitation-that is, when it could be read more narrowly to resolve its constitutional concerns-courts will generally decline to "rewrite" the law or enjoin it outright. 162 Upon FOSTA's enactment, legislators, President Trump, certain antitrafficking initiatives and victims of sex trafficking, and parties skeptical of a legitimate distinction between sex work and sex trafficking lauded the law as a victory for sex-trafficking victims nationwide. 164 On the other hand, free speech proponents and civil liberties organizations criticized the law's chilling effect on internet speech and UISP immunity, and sex workers (along with some anti-trafficking advocates) protested that the law would endanger them directly and would not lead to the hoped-for prophylactic effect on trafficking. 165 Advocates have already challenged FOSTA's constitutionality. 166 In September 2018, five plaintiffs 167 filed Woodhull Freedom Foundation v. United States 168 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia alleging that FOSTA either had already chilled or reasonably could chill protected speech concerning sex workers' health and safety, as well as speech entirely unrelated to sex work or sex trafficking. 169 The U.S. Attorney General defended FOSTA's constitutionality and filed a motion to dismiss, which the court granted. 170 However, the court declined to reach the 167. See id. at 192-94. The plaintiffs consist of the Woodhull Freedom Foundation, a lobbying organization supporting free speech; Human Rights Watch, an organization supporting, inter alia, the rights of consensual sex workers; Jesse Maley, an advocate for sex workers' rights and owner of a forum-style UISP where sex workers may discuss and review their experiences with organizations that purport to assist them; Eric Koszyk, a licensed massage therapist whose ability to advertise his nonsexual services has been inhibited by FOSTA; and the Internet Archive, an organization that has maintained a digital record of the internet since 1996. Id.
168 Under a narrow interpretation of FOSTA's language and scienter requirement, arguments for FOSTA's constitutionality may have merit. In its motion to dismiss the Woodhull complaint, the government stated that none of the protected speech that plaintiffs claimed would be proscribed was FOSTA's intended subject, and therefore, no constitutional issue existed. 173 Specifically, the government claimed that online speech that advocates for sexual freedom or the decriminalization of prostitution-two types of speech cited by plaintiffs as being threatened by FOSTA-fell well beyond FOSTA's purview. 174 The government argued that plaintiff Koszyk had no reason to believe his speech would be proscribed as his activity clearly fell outside FOSTA's ambit, and host website Craigslist would also face no "credible fear of prosecution" for publishing Koszyk's massage advertisement. 175 Drawing on previous federal jurisprudence on analogous subjects, the government opined: Advocating for the legalization of sex work . . . is the opposite of the intentional facilitation of illegal prostitution. Helping sex workers find appropriate service providers no more facilitates prostitution than rehabilitation services facilitate drug trafficking. Discussing "harm reductions, disability, age, health and personal safety" is not promoting or facilitating prostitution. 176 The government then argued that having addressed and exonerated these major prototypes of speech, any further infringement on protected speech could not be considered substantial enough to reach a threshold of unconstitutional overbreadth. 177 Although the Woodhull court declined to address plaintiffs' constitutional claims, it largely adopted the government's arguments vis-à-vis plaintiffs' standing. 178 These arguments for lack of standing are logically similar to the arguments for FOSTA's constitutionality: FOSTA, under its "intended" interpretation, is not so broad as to actually implicate any of these plaintiffs because the law was narrowly tailored to only proscribe unprotected speech from which illegal activity will directly follow. 179 This narrow interpretation of FOSTA's purview puts speech about prostitution and sex trafficking into two categories: speech that directly seeks to advertise sexual services for pay, which would be illegal and therefore unprotected by the First Amendment, 180 and speech that does not seek to advertise sex, which FOSTA purportedly would not criminalize. 181 This dichotomy would place the plaintiffs' challenge in Woodhull in a position similar to Backpage.com's failed constitutional challenge to the SAVE Act. 182 There, Backpage.com was unable to demonstrate that it intended to engage in speech that was at once proscribed and protected, since the SAVE Act criminalized knowingly advertising the "illegal sex trafficking of a minor or a victim of force, fraud, or coercion" 183 rather than the advertising of sex work generally (which would include legal adult services). 184 An analogous reading of FOSTA relies on the assumption that reference to the "promotion or facilitation of prostitution" 185 will be universally understood to make the clear distinction described above. A court could potentially hold that this is FOSTA's only valid interpretation, although the issue has yet to be litigated.
A narrow reading of scienter requirements may also support FOSTA's constitutionality. In finding that the plaintiff lacked standing, the Woodhull court implied that the plaintiffs' purposeful engagement in positive speech about sex work would be protected from criminal liability because the 176 plaintiffs would lack the requisite mens rea to have committed the crime in question. 186 FOSTA's "intent" requirement applied not to the content of the speech on its face, but to its ends. 187 FOSTA's legislative history supports this view somewhat and suggests that its drafters wanted the law to be interpreted narrowly; 188 the government further contended in Woodhull that it does not plan to prosecute UISPs that publish speech that is sympathetic to prostitution of the sort plaintiffs described. 189 Under this interpretation, challenges from parties subject to UISPs' self-censorship in FOSTA's wake would fail to state cognizable constitutional claims, as such censorship is arguably unnecessary under FOSTA; its proscription, therefore, would be a private action rather than a government activity and would not be prohibited by the First Amendment. 190 
B. FOSTA Violates the First Amendment Because Its Ban on UISP "Promotion and Facilitation of Prostitution" Reaches Protected Speech and Compels Overbroad Censorship
FOSTA's opponents in Woodhull and beyond argue that FOSTA's purview is significantly broader than supporters would have the public believe. 191 Contrary to the government's claims that FOSTA is implicitly inapplicable to speech promoting sex workers' health and safety, such speech has already been chilled. 192 As a plainly content-based regulation of speech, FOSTA is subject to strict scrutiny, which means that it should be found unconstitutional unless the government can prove that it is narrowly tailored and is the least restrictive way to achieve a legitimate government interest. 193 FOSTA's opponents argue that the law fails this test. They assert that the law is "not narrowly tailored" because "[i]t prohibits . . . speech about sex work that does not involve sex trafficking" and argue that the "draconian" prison sentences FOSTA prescribes cannot possibly amount to a "least . . . restrictive alternative to restricting online speech." 194 FOSTA's counterproductive effects to demonstrate that it does not further a "compelling government interest" as written. 195 The simple meanings of the words "promote" and "facilitate" connote a broad scope of activities. 196 Without statutory definitions limiting the interpretation of these words, it is difficult to argue, as the government does in its Woodhull filings, that FOSTA could not prosecute UISPs under the law's broader reading. 197 FOSTA could proscribe significant protected speech: "facilitation" of prostitution could encompass anything that makes it easier for a person to engage in sex work or exist as a sex worker, while "promotion" of prostitution could include any speech that supports or condones engaging in sex work. 198 Speech of this latter category that is unlikely to incite immediate illegal activity would be constitutionally protected under Brandenburg v. Ohio. 199 Interpretation of FOSTA's scienter requirements is also not a settled issue. Woodhull plaintiff Jesse Maley runs a UISP called RateThatRescue.org, which functions as a review-based forum for sex workers to rate the treatment they receive from various organizations, both sex-related and otherwise, on account of their involvement with sex work. 200 The purpose of this UISP is to help sex workers avoid impediments to safely conducting business. 201 The court found that Maley lacked standing because she could not demonstrate that she planned to intentionally coordinate the prostitution of another person. 202 However, per FOSTA's plain meaning, Maley's activity intentionally facilitates sex work. 203 The government's assurance that it does not plan to prosecute such activity does not amount to a legal preemption from doing so. 204 Under a broad interpretation of the law, the constitutional challenge to FOSTA is distinguished from Backpage.com's challenge to the SAVE Act and is arguably much more akin to the ACLU's successful challenge against the original CDA. In the SAVE Act challenge, Backpage.com was unable to assert that it intended to engage in speech that was both constitutionally protected and potentially proscribed by the statute in question. 205 This is not the case for Woodhull's plaintiffs or other potentially concerned parties. For example, in Reno v. ACLU, 206 the Supreme Court found that the original CDA's undefined language created uncertainty about its scope and evidenced its drafters' failure to appropriately tailor it to its goal. 207 The original CDA criminalized the knowing transmission of indecent material to minors over the internet and extended liability to intermediaries that knowingly permitted or engaged in such activity. 208 The Supreme Court found this prohibition unconstitutional, noting that the problem was not the CDA's goal of protecting minors, which was a legitimate state interest, 209 but the relative impossibility of enforcing the law as written without both circumscribing adults' ability to post indecent material online for other adults to consume and drastically changing the way the internet functioned. 210 In examining its overbreadth, the Court opined that although the original CDA was ostensibly meant to target pornographic material, "a speaker [could not] confidently assume that a serious discussion about birth control practices, homosexuality, . . . or the consequences of prison rape would not violate the CDA." 211 FOSTA raises parallel concerns.
Although the government contends that this preemptive chill amounts to private censorship rather than government suppression of speech, few practical alternative strategies exist to protect UISPs from liability under FOSTA. 212 The combination of overbroad and undefined language, strict penalties, and the rescission of third-party immunity may force UISPs to overmoderate user speech and proscribe protected material out of fear that more selective UISP efforts will leave them vulnerable to prosecution. 213 Further, FOSTA includes no safe harbor provision to allow UISPs to cure violations before liability sets in. 214 UISPs, therefore, have three choices: (1) check each piece of user content with human eyes prior to posting, which requires significant resources; (2) enlist technological efforts to moderate content, like "machine-learning algorithms to filter and block anything that relates to sex, including activities that have nothing to do with sex 219 and TheEroticReview.com, 220 have been shut down or have censored themselves out of fear that the user-generated content they host could be interpreted as promoting the sale of sexual services. 221 US Congress recently passed HR 1865, "FOSTA", seeking to subject websites to criminal and civil liability when third parties (users) misuse online personals unlawfully. Any tool or service can be misused. We can't take such risk without jeopardizing all our other services, so we have regretfully taken craigslist personals offline. Hopefully we can bring them back some day. [https://perma.cc/V3T9-RA4Z] (suggesting that Tumblr.com's ban on pornographic images may also have been prompted by FOSTA); Emily approach, FOSTA has already curtailed internet speech that does not advertise sex, including content posted for private consumption on document-hosting services. 222 Woodhull plaintiff Koszyk has been censored as an explicit result of FOSTA. 223 His advertisement for his massage services obviously falls outside of FOSTA's intended scope, as acknowledged by the government and the court, and, indeed, no rational interpretation of his post could construe it as advertising illegal activity. 224 Craigslist's elimination of advertisements like Koszyk's in the wake of FOSTA demonstrates that compliance with FOSTA demands moderation beyond what is strictly necessary. Even UISPs that prohibit only sex-related advertisements would be overbroad in their censorship: it is not a crime for consenting adults to arrange sexual interactions over the internet, 225 and the undiscerning eradication of all sexually charged advertisements would unconstitutionally infringe on such consensual interactions. 226 This sort of unilateral censorship is expected when any UISP can be prosecuted if a third party is eventually shown to have abused its platform. 227 The Reno Court ultimately found that the CDA's "content-based restriction of speech impose [d] an especially heavy burden on the Government to explain why a less restrictive provision would not be as effective as the CDA," which it failed to meet. 228 A similar burden should arguably be demanded of the government with regard to FOSTA. The government's stated goal in implementing FOSTA is stopping online sex trafficking; FOSTA's language suggests that it will impose liability on UISPs for much more activity than hosting sex-trafficking advertisements. 229 The criminal penalties imposed under FOSTA, furthermore, are significant. 230 Less restrictive means of achieving this goal arguably exist; 231 as such, FOSTA is unconstitutional as written. 232 III. "FURTHERING A LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT INTEREST":
WHAT DOES FOSTA REALLY DO?
Although FOSTA is still a very young law and significant data about its efficacy has yet to be collected or analyzed, some of its consequences have already surfaced on the internet and in offline communities nationwide. FOSTA's stated legal objective is to eliminate Section 230 immunity for UISPs that facilitate online sex trafficking. 233 Its practical goals, per its legislative history, were to shut down Backpage.com and its analogues, gut the sex-trafficking industry, and save vulnerable women and children from harm. 234 However, FOSTA's immediate effects have not toed this line-the law has, in fact, had devastating consequences for individuals performing commercial sexual services under consensual and coercive circumstances alike. 235 This Part first examines the extent to which FOSTA has achieved its stated goals and subsequently details FOSTA's collateral consequences beyond, or at odds with, what its supporters hoped it would accomplish.
A. A Good Cause?: Results Germane to FOSTA's Goals
Backpage.com has been shut down. 236 Craigslist has closed its personals section, which had hosted advertisements for sex. 237 UISPs without a direct link to commercial sexual activity have adopted more discerning policies regarding who may use their services. 238 FOSTA reportedly caused an initial dip in online advertisements for sexual services. 239 Although such advertisements have rebounded somewhat in number, it is not clear that they have returned to original levels. 240 Any reduction in advertisements for trafficked persons is surely a success, though formal statistics on FOSTA's efficacy in reducing the prevalence of sex trafficking generally, which also occurs offline, are not available. 241 Nevertheless, supporters have high hopes for a sustained prophylactic effect on sex trafficking. 242 Proponents of the increased responsibility that FOSTA imposes on UISPs can claim an immediate victory: Section 230's moderator "loophole" has been closed and the law is live. 243 Pre-FOSTA cases such as M.A. ex rel. P.K. v. Village Voice Media Holdings, LLC, 244 in which courts upheld UISP immunity in the face of horrific online trafficking that had occurred through an interactive platform, offer evidence of a bygone scenario that FOSTA has hopefully stymied from repetition in the future. 245 No case exists where a survivor of sex trafficking has sued a UISP under FOSTA's civil cause of action, or where a state or federal prosecutor has brought criminal charges under FOSTA against a UISP for its role in sex-trafficking activity, but such lawsuits could arise in the future.
B. An Unacceptable Cost: FOSTA's Means Do Not Justify Its Ends
The extent to which FOSTA's effects to date align with its goals is arguably exaggerated. It is not clear that FOSTA's articulated goals can be feasibly achieved through its implemented changes. 246 Perhaps most disturbingly, FOSTA has already caused a slew of collateral effects that endanger sex workers, and sex-trafficking victims, nationwide. 247 This section explores critiques of FOSTA's prospects for ending sex trafficking and discusses the serious harm FOSTA has already caused. It then suggests that such troubling collateral consequences undermine arguments for FOSTA's practicality and constitutionality. direct consequence of FOSTA, and evidence suggests these statistics have rebounded in recent months. 249 Additionally, there is no simple way to calculate which of those advertisements would have offered the services of a trafficked person as opposed to a consenting adult, or even which might have offered legal sexual services rather than activity criminalized by state prostitution laws. 250 FOSTA presumes that eliminating the ability of traffickers and "clients" to access one another online will strike a lethal blow to the trafficking industry. 251 Rather than ending online sex trafficking, FOSTA may simply drive the kinds of UISPs it purports to regulate off of U.S. servers and away from U.S. regulatory power. 252 Several sites operating as classified platforms or discussion forums for sex workers, such as Switter 253 and Red Umbrella Hosting, 254 have already moved operations to servers abroad. 255 These platforms have not been charged with any trafficking activity, but at least one was forced from its U.S.-based server as a direct result of FOSTA. 256 This option to set up shop abroad is ostensibly also available to parties with nefarious intent, which calls FOSTA's long-term efficacy into question.
For law enforcement, there is a documented ease to tracking and locating traffickers online. 257 Online advertisements with photographs or other identifying information may further assist the police in identifying and aiding specific victims. 258 These advertisements may constitute crucial digital evidence in eventual legal proceedings against perpetrators, as both law enforcement officials 259 and sex-trafficking survivors have noted. 260 Finally, FOSTA assumes that prostitution and sex trafficking are synonymous enough that the successful enactment of anti-sex-trafficking legislation depends on naming and inhibiting sex work as well. 261 In its legislative materials, Congress cited a link between prostitution and sex trafficking and implied that where the former is found, the latter will invariably follow. 262 It is not clear that this implication is true. 263 FOSTA's critics have opined that eliminating all online advertisements for sexual services was the Act's true aim and that lawmakers masked this sweeping legislative intent behind narratives of trafficking likely to garner bipartisan sympathy. 264 Regardless, sex work and sex trafficking are distinct activities. 265 Insofar as FOSTA's articulated goal is to curb sex trafficking, widespread consequences for consensual sex workers arguably exceed its intended purview, make no regulatory sense, and serve no legitimate government interest.
A Law with a Body Count
FOSTA directly endangers individuals who perform commercial sexual services by driving these transactions away from the relative protection of the internet and back onto the street. 266 Traditionally, solicitation of a sex worker's services took place during an in-person encounter that also functioned as an advertisement for business: a brothel 267 or, more recently, the street. 268 Street work is more dangerous than indoor work and can even be lethal. 269 Rape and assault are prevalent and seen as inevitable, and workers are at risk of violence from clients and law enforcement alike. 270 As the internet became a ubiquitous utility, sex workers were able to move the negotiation and solicitation stages of their business to online forums that did not demand physical presence. 271 Sex workers gained the means to create an electronic record of client communications, 272 screen potential clients, 273 and communicate with one another about dangerous clients, safe spaces, and other industry-specific health and safety tips. 274 The shift online revolutionized the industry, imbuing sex work with a previously nonexistent level of safety and decreasing the need for third parties as security or advertisement intermediaries. 275 FOSTA confines commercial sex to its most dangerous model. 277 Since FOSTA's enactment, sex workers have reported an increase in communication from "pimps" claiming that their services are necessary. 278 Although some sex workers work with third parties voluntarily, 279 others may feel pressured into a situation that could easily become sex trafficking, meaning that FOSTA could actually facilitate sex trafficking by forcing consensual sex workers into coercive situations. 280 Further, the workers most endangered by street-based sex work tend to be from marginalized communities. 281 Women of color are disproportionately arrested and prosecuted for prostitution-related offenses, 282 and forcing sex work into the street will only increase these arrests. 283 In addition to scrubbing advertisements for consensual sex from online forums, FOSTA threatens access to secondary online resources used for protection and verification. 284 None of these consequences has a valid relationship to FOSTA's purported aim.
IV. CURING FOSTA'S UNCONSTITUTIONALITY AND HALTING ITS HARMFUL CONSEQUENCES REQUIRE THE LAW'S REPEAL FOSTA is a deeply flawed law. 285 Its threats to criminalize significant categories of protected speech have already led to a documented chilling effect on speech due to its gross misunderstanding of the interaction between sex work and sex trafficking. 286 FOSTA warrants immediate action to redraft its unconstitutionally overbroad elements. However, simply altering FOSTA's defective provisions will not completely resolve its underlying policy shortcomings. As such, while Part IV.A of this Note proposes ways in which FOSTA's statutory language may be improved, Part IV.B advocates for FOSTA's full repeal.
A. Suggestions for Altering FOSTA's Faults
FOSTA's unconstitutional overbreadth hinges chiefly on its ambiguous use of the words "promote" and "facilitate" in 18 U.S.C. § 2421A and, by extension, in Section 230. 287 Uncertainty over the scope of these undefined activities has led to either unconstitutional criminalization of protected speech 288 or an unconstitutional chilling effect emanating from overcautious [Most replies come] from people seeking to exploit the sex worker community because they know that we don't have many platforms to advertise from right now."); see also Massey, supra note 269 ("Before you say, 'Just get rid of the ads, then,' know that online ads themselves are one of the greatest tools for protecting yourself as a sex worker: They make it possible to screen clients, arrange safe indoor working conditions, and establish a communication record with clients that street-based work doesn't provide.").
285. FOSTA may serve as a model to stifle other kinds of speech. FOSTA's enduring existence, and the broad bipartisan support that midwifed it into the world of internet law, prompt serious concerns over Section 230's ability to withstand the censorship of other speech Congress might find distasteful, especially where-as with sex work-harm-reduction efforts to curtail dangerous activity are at odds with zero-tolerance policies of strict criminalization. self-censorship of speech that FOSTA does not intend to proscribe. 289 Replacing FOSTA's problematic language with more explicitly targeted verbiage would potentially help quell confusion 290 and produce legislation that is more in line with the government's assertion of FOSTA's aim. 291 However, this Note does not support amended legislation that fails to cure FOSTA's meritless inclusion of prostitution in its statutory text. Although invoking prostitution in a law meant to curb sex trafficking evidences legislation not narrowly tailored to its goal, prostitution is admittedly illegal in most of the United States, 292 and as such, those advertising sex workers' services online cannot claim engagement in constitutionally protected speech. 293 However, sex workers do have a human right to personal security. Facilitating endangerment, assault, and death, as FOSTA effectively does for sex workers, is not a legitimate government interest-ostensibly, it is the very thing FOSTA seeks to eliminate.
In addition to clarifying the activities FOSTA criminalizes, collapsing FOSTA's principal and "aggravated" 294 violations into a single crime relating to sex trafficking could arguably do much more to protect consensual sex workers. Such an amendment might read:
Whoever, using a facility or means of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, owns, manages, or operates an interactive computer service (as such term is defined in section 230(f) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 230(f))), or conspires or attempts to do so, with the intent to coordinate sex-trafficking transactions in violation of § 1591(a) of this title, shall be fined under this title . . . . This revision would correctly exempt speech asserting a positive opinion of prostitution, advocating for its decriminalization, or seeking to help sex workers conduct their work safely, and it would redirect FOSTA's focus from proscribing advertisements for sex work to eradicating those advertisements that hawk the services of trafficked persons. 295 Other scholars have also proposed statutory tweaks to mitigate FOSTA's damage, including reextending immunity to any UISP that "takes reasonable steps to prevent or address unlawful uses of its services once warned about such uses" 296 or setting a higher bar for UISP liability that would require the UISP to have "purposefully encourage [d] 297 One issue is that using the same standard of activity to criminalize UISPs' direct involvement in crimes conducted digitally (e.g., cyberstalking) and indirect involvement in offline crimes for which the internet is simply a conduit (e.g., sex trafficking) may result in imprecise and overbroad legislation. This concern aside, this latter proposal is promising.
B. Repeal FOSTA: Proposing a Conscientious and Pragmatic Replacement
Statutory improvements, however, are half measures. Arguments that sex trafficking will stop if the internet ceases to permit it 298 ignore a fundamental fact about sex trafficking that distinguishes it from other internet evils 299 : the transaction may occur online, but the act occurs in person. Driving sexual advertisements off the internet only benefits FOSTA's cause if it significantly reduces the offline incidence of sex trafficking. As FOSTA does nothing to further track or criminalize traffickers themselves, there is little evidence to suggest that the market will shrink rather than simply adapt. 300 Traffickers will continue to operate, farther beyond the reach of law enforcement, 301 and at least portions of the industry will return to the dangerous street-based solicitation model predating the internet. 302 Sex trafficking is a legitimate problem and a horrifying practice. The concerns that anti-trafficking advocates have about what happens to victims, especially child victims, who are not found and not saved, are real. 303 Stopping sex trafficking is a legitimate government aim, but a law so poorly drafted that it fails to achieve its chief objective, 304 while also causing significant and unnecessary collateral harm, 305 offers little merit to society or to populations imperiled by sex trafficking. FOSTA makes it more dangerous to be a UISP operator. 306 It makes it more dangerous to be a sex worker. 307 It may even make it more dangerous to be a trafficked person. 308 But it does not, in any discernable way, increase the risk involved in being a sex trafficker. Nor does it address any number of socioeconomic or environmental factors that advocates for sex-trafficking survivors have identified as concrete ways to curtail such trafficking. 309 If Congress truly hopes to eradicate sex trafficking, it should repeal FOSTA and replace it with a three-pronged approach consisting of: (1) the decriminalization of consensual sex work; (2) narrow legislation that compels the pursuit and capture of the true wrongdoers in commercial sextraffickers themselves-while leaving the internet otherwise intact; and (3) comprehensive policy reform that adequately addresses the needs of trafficking survivors and offers socioeconomic support to at-risk communities to diminish future victimization.
FOSTA fails in part because its drafters focused on commercial sex as an unequivocal social harm rather than on forced sex as a crime that may be commodified. 310 Sex workers and exploited individuals have distinct needs that are difficult to meet with one-size-fits-all legislation. 311 A law targeting advertisements for trafficked persons online would be better tailored to its goal if it sought to proscribe only coercive sex while allowing consensual activity to continue unhindered. 312 This objective could be more readily realized if consensual sex work were not illegal. 313 Globally, decriminalizing sex work has been demonstrably beneficial to improving health and safety in commercial sex, 314 reducing violence against sex workers, and curtailing trafficking activity. 315 Adopting decriminalization in the United States would allow the sex work industry to be regulated and to regulate itself, which would contribute invaluably to a better-moderated internet. Sexual content could be better scrutinized for evidence of coercion without broadly implicating workers who do not see themselves as victims and who rely on the internet to safely conduct business, 316 and sex workers could report trafficking without fear of self-incrimination. 317 An approach less dogmatic than FOSTA would also offer strategic enforcement benefits. 318 Eighteen states have enacted safe harbor laws that partially decriminalize child prostitution so as to properly identify trafficked children as victims, rather than perpetrators, of crimes and protect them accordingly under the law. 319 These safe harbor laws, however, are only meaningful when coupled with a concerted effort to locate, shield, and defend these victims. The internet is an incredible tool with the potential to be harnessed for good. Incentivizing UISPs to investigate and report unlawful activity on their platforms, instead of forcing overmoderation before content can even exist, 320 would keep bad actors operating within a regulatable system that can establish evidence crucial to prosecution rather than simply pushing crime out of sight. 321 At the same time, resources must be directed to offline enforcement actions against traffickers, including comprehensive investigation of crime tips associated with online activity and affirmative screening mechanisms to flag problematic content without broadly proscribing entire areas of speech. 322 In conjunction with the decriminalization of sex work, and with law enforcement able to fully utilize the internet as a resource, trafficking could be better hindered at its source, with traffickers properly held accountable instead of innocent parties. 323 Finally, social supports must be augmented for trafficking survivors and at-risk populations, which will decrease the risk of victimization and revictimization. 324 Socioeconomic reform efforts that aim to mitigate trafficking risk factors, such as "poverty, lack of education, poor access to stable and affordable housing, undocumented status, . . . LGBTQ New Zealand and advocating for parallel measures in South Africa). The decriminalization of sex work is a complex issue. The brevity of the discussion herein is not meant to suggest simplicity.
316. 327 Criminal justice reforms that support survivors rather than criminalize them 328 would help such individuals recover and could protect them from future coercion. 329 By exculpating sex workers, aiding trafficked persons, and directly pursuing traffickers, a legislative effort that follows this tripartite scheme would reduce sex trafficking in the United States while also limiting injury to individuals who provide commercial sexual services. Accordingly, though redrafting could cure its overbreadth, 330 FOSTA must be repealed and replaced with a more pragmatic legal effort to feasibly achieve its goals.
CONCLUSION
Sex-trafficking victims and survivors deserve protection and justice-but consensual sex workers cannot be seen as expendable casualties of that goal. FOSTA was neither a necessary nor a productive step in abolishing online sex trafficking. It is unconstitutionally overbroad, fails to achieve its policy objectives, impermissibly harms sex workers, and frustrates law enforcement efforts to protect victims of sex trafficking. FOSTA is poorly tailored legislation that furthers an indefensible policy: it condemns sex workers to harm by unconstitutionally limiting speech that protects them and by restricting their work to a hazardous arena. The law is hostile to its own goals and to vulnerable individuals nationwide, and merely redrafting the legislation will not adequately resolve these concerns. 
